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Plato’s Republic and
Censorship in Philosophy 
and Poetry1
Mairead Costigan
Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard 
Are sweeter.
 —Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn”
A poem should be palpable and mute 
As a globed fruit
Dumb 
As old medallions to the thumb
Silent as the sleeve-worn stone 
Of casement ledges where the moss has grown—
A Poem should be wordless 
As the ﬂight of birds.
 —Archibald MacLeish, “Ars Poetica” 1-8
I. Introduction
In this paper, I consider Plato’s position about the censorship of poetry in 
the Republic. In the concluding discussion of censorship in Book X, Socrates 
calls for auditors to “listen benevolently” to any who might wish to “plead 
[poetry’s] cause in prose without meter”, attempting to show “that she is 
not only delightful but beneﬁcial to orderly government and all the life of 
men” (Rep 607d).2 I will argue that there are important respects in which 
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his interlocutors fail to meet the conditions of benevolent listeners, and 
in so doing fail to reach a genuine consensus about poetry. I contend that 
we must apprehend this failure and consider what bearing it has on the 
conclusions reached about poetry by the interlocutors. I suggest that by 
means of the dialogical structure of the Republic Plato himself provides 
the grounds for a defence of poetry, albeit one that is hidden within the 
terms of a quarrel. In arriving at this contention, I consider the question 
of who or what is censored in, and censored by, discussions of the ancient 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry.
II. Mimêsis and the Effect of Poetry
Before turning directly to the drama of Plato’s Republic, we would do 
well to remind ourselves of the phenomena of poetry we are dealing with. 
It is all too easy to forget that in the sixth, ﬁfth and fourth centuries, Greek 
poetry was by and large experienced in public performances, presented 
orally to audiences, generally with music and/or choreography, and 
almost always with some form of impersonation, whether indirectly, by 
a narrator, or directly, by actors. 
Eric Havelock argued that poetic forms of thought and discourse—
rhythmic, formulaic, concrete and emotive—encouraged individuals to 
identify themselves with the situations and stories presented in poetic 
performances, with poet, actor and audience abandoning themselves to 
the “overall body of experience … incorporated in a rhythmic narrative.”3 
“Only when the spell is fully effective,” says Havelock, is it psychologically 
possible for an auditor’s mnemonic powers to be fully activated, enabling 
them to memorise and recall the lessons of history, technology, social 
organisation and morality embodied in such rhythmic narrative.4 Auditors 
surrender themselves to the poetic experience, absorbing its teachings in 
an uncritical fashion. Havelock suggests that it was the more uncritical 
and unreﬂective forms of thinking associated with an oral-based culture 
that prompted Plato’s hostility towards poetry. According to Havelock, 
Plato’s concern with abstract intellectualism prompted him to object to 
a tradition that taught people to speak and listen and memorise without 
thought and reﬂection and evaluation.5 
Plato’s Republic and Censorship in Philosophy and Poetry
L&A 2009.1.indd   115 9/9/09   8:49:32 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 116 
Havelock’s account provides a basis for thinking that Plato’s quarrel 
with poetry is directed at an oral culture, in which poetry is heard, rather 
than a literate culture in which poetry is read.  This idea is borne out in the 
Republic. When Socrates speaks of the need to censor tales about warring 
gods, he says that such tales ought not to be “lightly told” to unthinking 
youth, and that “the best way would be to bury them in silence” (378a). 
Only a very small audience should, he thinks, be “admitted under pledge 
of secrecy and after sacriﬁcing, not a pig, but some huge and unprocurable 
victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales” 
(378a).  When Adimantus claims that tales about warring gods are “hard 
sayings” (378a), Socrates points to other tales that should not be “said in the 
hearing of a young man” (378b-c). No such tales should be admitted, and, 
Socrates says, “the ﬁrst stories that (children) hear should be so composed 
as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears” (378e).6
Many objections have been raised against Havelock’s general view 
of the transition between Greek oral and literate culture.7 But if we 
follow only his point about the effect of the auditory experience, we can 
understand more clearly Plato’s concern about poetry.  Havelock gives 
detailed accounts of the internal physical and psychological processes 
involved in the act of memorising a rhythmic narrative passed on from 
mouth to ear, and considers the reason for Plato’s concern with these 
processes. The physical and psychological energy required for rhythmic 
memorisation is compared to “lifting a weight and carrying it.”8 The 
motions and reﬂexes performed by the lungs, larynx, tongue and teeth 
when repeating, memorising and recalling the metrical patterns and 
verbal formulas of poetic speech are considered along with the parallel 
rhythmic bodily motions of the ears and limbs in responding to the 
music accompanying signiﬁcant speech in poetic performance.9 The 
entire nervous system is seen to be “geared to the task of memorisation 
… forming a part of an unconscious design to preserve and transmit a 
tradition and way of life.”10 
It is easy to see the effect that such sensual and emotional experience 
may have on the individual soul. In keeping with Plato’s image of the 
poetic Muse as a magnet and of those who come in contact with it—poet, 
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actor and auditor—as iron rings that are attracted and empowered by 
the magnet to form a chain of enthusiasm and inspiration,11 we see how 
the poetic experience is basically the same for each member of the chain. 
Each individual identiﬁes with “the doings and sayings of the characters 
portrayed in the rhythmic narrative.”12 Yet from Plato’s perspective, the 
way actors and auditors in the theatre indulge emotions like fear and 
anger in response to the trials and tribulations of characters portrayed 
on the stage seems inappropriate as a response to popular entertainment, 
indicating a surrender to illusion. Mimetic indulgence strengthens the 
appetitive part of the soul at the expense of the rational faculty, with the 
consequence that spectators come to resemble the passion-stricken and 
driven characters portrayed on stage.13 The majority of people mistake 
theatrical images for reality—a mistake caused by the power of mimetic 
representation to bypass the rational faculty of the soul and directly 
address the appetitive part. Poets, actors and auditors alike experience 
blind emotions stemming from the unreﬂective part of their souls.
III. Censorship in and of Poetry 
This account of the poetic experience involves the unspoken (and thus 
unheard) view that poetry itself already imposes a kind of tacit censorship 
upon the listener. With the exception of a “select few”—those who evade 
being corrupted by mimetic poetry by possessing “as an antidote a 
knowledge of its real nature”—individuals in the theatre are deceived 
through the tacitly concealing nature of mimêsis.  In Republic Book III, 
Socrates singles out tragic and comic poetry as having the most harmful 
effect, since these forms require poet, actor and auditor to work wholly 
through imitation, concealing their own identities as far as possible in 
order to ape the identities of whatever subjects are portrayed. Unlike epic 
poetry, which involves both imitation and abstract narration (where the 
narrator presents merely as a narrator rather than, as in Plato’s dialogues, 
as some other imitated character) and unlike dithyrambic poetry, which 
involves narration and no imitation, tragic and comic poetry are imitative 
through and through.14 As a purely imitative form of poetry, tragedy, in 
particular, is pin-pointed for its corrupting effect on the inner state and 
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constitution of the individual. The concealing nature of sensual response 
to tragedy mimics the concealing nature of the narrative being embodied.15 
The magnetic power of mimetic poetry is seen to inspire the appetitive 
part of the soul, blinding the rest of it from the overseeing gaze of reason.16 
On Plato’s account of mimetic poetry, this concealment of and from reason 
may occur at every level of the artistic chain. Plato appears to respond 
to the concealment or censorship within poetry by proposing a counter-
concealment through the censorship of poetry.
In the Republic Plato invites his readers to consider further the 
censorship of poetry within the individual soul. In Book X, Socrates draws 
a precise analogy between the constitutions of the soul and the state, and 
his listeners are invited to view the censorship as pertaining to both. This 
analogy, ﬁrst introduced in Book II,17 enables Plato to construe the parts 
of the city metaphorically. In referring to the “polity” within the soul,18 it 
will be recalled that he construes the rational element as the proper ruler 
(the part represented by the class of Philosopher-Kings at the level of the 
state); the spirited part as the proper guardian (that represented by the 
class of Auxiliaries at the state-level); and the appetitive part as the proper 
labourer (that represented by the class of Workers at the state-level). 
Within the framework of this analogy, Socrates afﬁrms that “we shall 
at last say that we are justiﬁed in not admitting [the mimetic poet] into 
the well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters [the senseless] 
element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational 
part, just as when in a state one puts bad men in power and turns the city 
over to them and ruins the better sort.” “Precisely in the same manner”, he 
continues, “we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual 
soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from 
reality, and by currying favor with the senseless element” within it (Rep 
605b-c). 
Thus, censorship seems unavoidable, both within the state and 
the individual soul.  Either the poet (or his counterpart in the soul) is 
censored for the sake of order, or else the poet, if abided, will censor 
the order and rule of reason. The necessity of censorship suggests the 
possibility of ambivalence about forms of communication and thought 
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in general. Indeed, the absence of any ambivalence in this regard might 
indicate a conscious or unconscious concealment. Yet, there is no mention 
of any ambivalence on the part of Socrates and his interlocutors in the 
Republic.
I maintain that ambivalence about the poetic experience is censored 
from the Republic, with there being evidence of a conscious cover-up on the 
part of Plato and his protagonist, Socrates, and of an unwitting one on the 
part of Socrates’ two main interlocutors, Glaucon and Adimantus. I will 
argue that the lack of ambivalence displayed by Socrates’ interlocutors 
signiﬁes their lack of awareness of the real nature of poetry, and that this 
in turn signiﬁes their inability to pronounce justice on matters concerning 
poetry. This inability will be indicated through outlining the respects in 
which these characters are tacitly censored by their own ignorance in their 
agreements with Socrates. 
IV. Censorship and Ignorance: The Example of Glaucon and 
Adimantus
While differences in character can be detected between the three main 
interlocutors after Republic I,19 there is a shift towards homogenisation—a 
shift that Mary Blundell interprets as conscious self-censorship in which 
Plato employs mimêsis that will not “fragment the characters of narrator, 
reader and listener, or encourage them to identify with dangerous 
models”, but, rather, will “guide them towards a single, consistent and 
virtuous ethos.”20 This is consistent with the view I have expressed that at 
least some attitudes towards poetry are censored from the Republic.  Yet 
even in the ‘homogenised’ characters we can detect subtle differences in 
awareness, ability, and motivation. I want to show that sometimes when 
Socrates and his two interlocutors appear to be in agreement, they have a 
different appreciation of what it is they are agreeing to.  I will then draw 
some conclusions about what that means for the topic of censorship.
I begin with Glaucon.  Understanding how far he appreciates the 
discussion is important because his agreements inﬂuence the outcome. 
Glaucon’s inﬂuence, however, often incorporates ignorance.  This can 
be seen, for example, in his discussion of the nature required of future 
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guardians (374-6). The passage is not directly related to the quarrel with 
poetry, but the incorporation of ignorance into the agreement there is 
characteristic of Glaucon, and I will argue that this feature has a bearing 
on issues of censorship in general. 
The discussion at 374-6 begins with an analogy between the natures 
of well-bred men and well-bred hounds. Socrates and Glaucon agree that 
both natures require perception, quick apprehension, strength in the face 
of adversity, and bravery. Both also require high spiritedness (375a-b). 
Socrates, however, raises an apparent problem with these requirements: 
“How”, he asks, “will [the guardians] escape being savage to one another 
and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature?” (375b).  For, he 
continues, “there appears to be an opposition between the spirited type 
and the gentle nature.” Glaucon readily agrees and adds that since the 
requirements  “resemble impossibilities”, they preclude the very possibility 
of there being a good guardian (375b). 
Socrates then turns to Glaucon and says “We deserve to be at a 
loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison we set before 
ourselves” (375d).  Surely the use of the ﬁrst person plural here is merely 
courteous.  Socrates hasn’t lost sight of anything, or else he wouldn’t be 
able to tell what he had lost sight of! His remark to Glaucon shows, then, 
that Glaucon has not really understood the analogy in the ﬁrst place. To 
help him, Socrates points out that it is the nature of good hounds to be 
“friendly with their familiars and with those whom they recognize, but the 
opposite to those whom they do not know” (375e). Glaucon admits this 
point and concludes that the requirements of gentleness and harshness 
are not, after all, incompatible. He is then led to the admission that the 
required qualities are also possible in men.
Looking closely at this comparison allows us to see what is and is not 
understood by Socrates and Glaucon. Plainly, Glaucon is an avid supporter 
of Socrates. This support is evident in his immediate and unqualiﬁed 
agreements throughout the passage. Yet his ignorance of the possibility 
that gentleness and harshness can be combined in a single nature prompts 
us to question just how far he understands Socrates’ analogy between 
well-bred hounds and well-bred men. For it was the possession of both 
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of these apparently contradictory qualities that prompted Socrates to 
compare the two natures in the ﬁrst place, and it is this combination of 
qualities that Glaucon continued to believe was impossible, even after the 
comparison was introduced.
This example provides an illustration of Glaucon appearing to grasp 
an analogy that he really misapprehends. Socrates and Glaucon appear 
to agree to the same premises being considered, and to agree generally 
about what is being discussed. And yet, what the two actually perceive 
in each case is shown to be different. Attention to how they differ in their 
admissions reveals how they differ in their awareness of, and motivations 
for, what is admitted.
If two characters agree to a stated premise, while one of the two is 
tacitly censored, by his own ignorance, from a full apprehension of what 
is conceded, what bearing will this have on their joint investigation? Will 
it be a straightforward matter to establish what is and isn’t agreed to in the 
investigation? And will it be clear-cut whether the two characters would 
reach the same overall conclusion to the investigation if each carried it out 
on their own? In the case of the inquiry concerning the admission of poets 
to the ideal state, it is necessary to consider these questions in relation to 
the roles played by Socrates and Glaucon. Do the two characters mean 
the same thing by censoring the poets, and by failing to admit them into 
the city?
[Editor’s note: There appears to be a lacuna here. One would expect at this point 
to have some discussion of how Glaucon misunderstands the issue of censorship, 
and how his misunderstanding inﬂuences the shape of things.]
Adimantus, too, is censored by his own ignorance. This can be seen 
in his discussion with Socrates of tales about the gods.  Socrates and 
Adimantus ﬁrst classify tales as falling under two species—“the one true 
and the other false” (376e). Socrates goes on to explain, however, that in 
fact all tales are false, though they may contain truth within them (377a). 
A different distinction is then employed without any apparent notice. 
Stories must, it is agreed, be carefully monitored, so as to protect children 
from listening to “any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers 
and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those 
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thought desirable for them to hold when they are grown up” (377b). “We 
must”, says Socrates, “begin, then, it seems, with a censorship over our 
story-makers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject” 
(377b-c). The original distinction between true and false tales, then, is 
misleading or at least unclear. As a result, there is subsequent conﬂation 
of “true” with “what is deemed desirable for children to hear” and “false” 
with “what is deemed contrary to the desirable”, i.e. with what is socially 
fault-worthy.
This observation is relevant to the question whether Socrates and 
Adimantus possess the same awareness of what they agree to when the 
discussion turns to the “patterns or norms of right speech about the gods” 
(379a). There it is ﬁrst agreed that the true qualities of God, whatever they 
actually are, must always be attributed to him, whether one composes 
in epic, melic or tragic verse (379a). On the basis of this agreement, 
Adimantus concludes that God, being good, cannot be the cause of any 
evil or harm. 
There is an intriguing parallel between this exchange and the one 
between Socrates and Glaucon in 374-6. Just as Socrates led Glaucon to 
declare that it was impossible to combine gentleness and savagery in the 
guardians’ nature, he leads Adimantus to the view that it is impossible 
to combine gentleness and savagery in divine nature. In both exchanges, 
Socrates’ interlocutor fails to consider the possibility of a benevolent 
character being harsh.  In the case of the guardians this conclusion was 
explicitly overturned. In light of that, it surely needs to be asked whether 
the view that the gods cannot be the cause of harm ought also to be 
overturned.  Socrates, it seems, supplies inconsistent reasons for not 
overturning it. First, he tells Adimantus that “we must either forbid [the 
poets] to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must declare 
that what God did was righteous and good, and [the woeful] were 
beneﬁted by their chastisement” (380a-b). Yet only a little later (380d-
381c), when discussing the divine nature he says that God, “being the 
fairest and best possible, abides forever simply in his own form.” The 
permission apparently granted to the poets to declare that God visits woes 
upon people who deserve them is inconsistent with the divine isolation 
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envisaged in 381c.  “[Abiding] simply forever in his own form” would 
preclude God from acting harshly or beneﬁcently towards men, whether 
from righteousness or any other motive. There is no indication that 
Adimantus notices this inconsistency, or that he has any understanding 
of the real nature of God.
In view of this, we must ask whether Adimantus understands the 
reasons for censoring the poets.  It seems that Socrates does his best to 
confuse him, because he says, “neither would the saying of such things 
[sc. that God is the cause of evil to anyone], if they are said, be holy, nor 
would they be proﬁtable to us or concordant with themselves” (380b-c). Here 
the claim that such sayings are not proﬁtable to us makes them fault-
worthy, whereas the claim that they are not concordant with themselves 
just means they are false (i.e. the term ‘god’ is not consistent with the term 
‘evil’).  The claim that such sayings are not holy could be based either 
on their fault-worthiness or their falsity or both. Thus, it appears that 
the telling of false and/or fault-worthy tales provides us with confused 
grounds for censoring poetry. And on these grounds Adimantus might 
think he is censoring poetry for being false, when in fact he is censoring 
it for being fault-worthy.
The difference between understanding the nature of God and seeing 
the social value of promoting a certain theology exposes the problem of 
confusing ‘false’ and ‘fault-worthy’. Socrates states that he and Adimantus 
must not:
admit at all … that gods war with gods and plot against one another and 
contend—for it is not true either—if we wish our future guardians to deem 
nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another … if there 
is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarrelled 
with his fellow citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety, that is the 
sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to 
children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel 
the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. (378c, roman mine)
In this passage, Socrates’ driving concern is with the potential harm 
caused by the telling of certain tales about gods and men, not with 
the truth or falsity of the tales themselves.  Indeed, he may believe the 
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tales to be false, but the reasons for their being false—which depend on 
understanding the real nature of God—are not presented as something 
people should be told instead. If people can be persuaded that tales of 
retributive, contentious gods are false, and if poets can be compelled to 
sing the praises of gods and heroes in all they compose, then Socrates 
will be satisﬁed.21
With respect to their role in this inquiry, Socrates refers to Adimantus 
and himself as “founders of a state” (379a). Given their agreement that 
leaders of a state may employ serviceable lies in protecting and beneﬁting 
its citizens, it could be asked whether any such falsehood (e.g. in what 
it is desirable to say about the gods) is being propagated here. If so, is it 
likely that both Socrates and Adimantus are cognisant of it? Adimantus 
approves of Socrates’ proposed censorship of “false” tales about gods and 
men, so it appears that they are in complete agreement. But Adimantus 
fails to notice the conﬂation of false and fault-worthy tales. And since 
we have reason to believe that he doesn’t understand the real nature of 
God (as was shown by his willingness to accept both divine isolation and 
divine beneﬁcence), it is quite possible that Adimantus doesn’t have what 
it takes to be a real founder of a state. If there were a noble lie being told 
about the gods, Adimantus might not appreciate it. 
It is now possible to compare Socrates’ earlier exchange with Glaucon 
and the one being considered here with Adimantus. It was suggested that 
ignorance acts as a kind of tacit censor in both interlocutors.  In Glaucon’s 
case, his ignorance of the real nature of the guardians made him unable 
to appreciate the analogy between well-bred men and well-bred hounds. 
Socrates did not keep Glaucon in the dark, but exposed his ignorance 
to him. Adimantus was unable to appreciate the requirements of divine 
nature because he could not recognise the inconsistency of divine isolation 
and divine beneﬁcence.In Adimantus’ case, however, it is apparent that 
Socrates keeps deliberately quiet about Adimantus’ misunderstanding of 
a crucial aspect of inquiry.  Socrates does not resolve for Adimantus the 
truth about the nature of God.  
Unlike his interlocutor, who expresses unhesitating (and inconsistently 
explained) belief in the truth of the claim that God can work no evil upon 
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men, Socrates merely repeats the truth claim, simultaneously emphasising 
that it must be upheld for the sake of its social consequences. In his 
presentations to Adimantus he always depicts the belief as true, but 
he never resolves the  grounds of its truth; whether God works no evil, 
but only good upon men, or whether, alone by himself in isolation, he 
works neither. On this reading, the following scenario can be constructed: 
Socrates does not reveal to Adimantus the true nature of the gods, but 
allows him to conﬂate false and fault-worthy tales about them. He allows 
Adimantus to fault tales about vengeful, deceitful gods for their harmful 
effects on “unthinking young persons,” and to deem them false on that 
account. At the same time, he allows Adimantus to believe those tales 
that depict God as the cause of good things for men, on account of the 
beneﬁcial effects they have, even though this belief might not be true.  It 
is apparent that Adimantus is unaware of any pretence or equivocation, 
but agrees unquestioningly to the censorship of all “false” tales about God. 
His own ignorance is kept quiet from him, as it is to be kept quiet from 
all unthinking young persons. Only a select few are able to appreciate 
the true and false (as opposed to the socially desirable and undesirable) 
in tales about God.22 
V. Socrates as one of the “Select Few”
What evidence is there to align Socrates with the “select few” admitted 
to hear the censored tales of gods and heroes, and to align Glaucon and 
Adimantus with the majority who are refused admission? We have already 
seen that Socrates describes himself as a “founder of the state”, while we 
had reason to question whether Adimantus deserved that appellation. 
When Glaucon re-enters the inquiry and is presented with Socrates’ 
account of “true musicians” we can see how founders of a state must 
belong to the “select few.” The true musicians must possess the knowledge 
and wisdom required of true leaders and legislators:
… (Is it not so that) we shall never be true musicians … —neither we nor 
the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are able to 
recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness, 
and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that 
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contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever 
found, disregarding them neither in triﬂes nor in great things, but believing 
the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline? (402c, 
roman mine)
This passage provides evidence that the true statesman needs to 
hear the poets’ “false” tales of gods and heroes. And this is all the more 
important given that the true leader is portrayed as naturally ignorant 
of vice, and as able to learn of it only through observation. In that case, 
it seems sensible to expose future guardians to vice through the telling 
of stories, rather than by risking their safety at the hands of non-ﬁctional 
villains.23  Thus, in order to gain knowledge not only of good and virtuous 
qualities, but of their opposites too, it is natural and necessary for future 
leaders to hear tales of evil and viciousness.24 Indeed, these are the very 
things that Adimantus would need to hear and discriminate, were he able 
to understand the true nature of the gods.
It is signiﬁcant that the good and virtuous character will require 
knowledge of evil and vice. Socrates raises this point at 408-9 in 
discussing the nature of good and evil souls. The good, he says, must 
acquire knowledge of every type of soul in order to become true leaders. 
This idea is discussed elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues, for example in the 
Phaedrus. The true orator and dialectician is said to possess knowledge 
of every kind of nature, and to have discovered the type of speech 
appropriate to each. This “practitioner” of speech orders and arranges 
his discourse according to this knowledge, “addressing a variegated soul 
in a variegated style that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and a 
simple soul in a simple style” (Phr 277c).  Socrates appears to be such a 
practitioner of speech, or at least he is cast in that role.  Not only is he 
the founder of the “city in speech” of the Republic, he is the one who 
must lead Glaucon and Adimantus in speech.  Accordingly, he must 
possess knowledge of the true nature of human souls and of the sorts 
of discourse appropriate to these.
How could possession of this knowledge protect statesmen from the 
harmful effects of poetry? It is possible to answer this by turning to the 
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order and structure of the just person’s soul. Having, in the middle books 
of the Republic, outlined the tripartite model of the soul, Socrates makes 
reference to it at the end of the dialogue in justifying the censorship of 
mimetic poetry. With Glaucon as his interlocutor, it is agreed that mimetic 
poetry involves a corruption of the soul, strengthening the inferior 
elements within it, and bypassing the superior rational faculty (605a). 
“[W]ith rare exceptions”, this putrefaction is seen to blemish even the 
“better sort” of soul, a point which is agreed to be of primary concern 
(605c). It is interesting, however, that even at this point in the dialogue, 
when the strictest censorship of poetry is handed down, there is still 
mention of the rare few who stand beyond need of this measure. 
The exemption of these select few—those possessing knowledge of the 
true nature of poetry—can be explained by pointing to a crucial difference 
in the way their souls respond to poetic mimesis. Given that the just soul 
is ordered in such a way that its two inferior parts are harmonised under 
the direction of the rational, it seems to follow that no “bypassing” of 
reason could occur within it. For the just person, then, no danger would 
arise in indulging the poetic muse. And, it is precisely this person whom 
Socrates pinpoints for the ofﬁce of guardian (Rep 409–10). 
This explanation provides a compelling reason for aligning true 
statesmen with the select few admitted to hear the whole gamut of poetic 
tones. By considering the tripartite image of the soul, an explanation has 
been given for how these select few escape harm from the poets. Now it 
needs to be seen what further evidence can be given for aligning Socrates’ 
two interlocutors with the majority who fall prey to these sayings.
VI. The Trial Imposed on Glaucon and Adimantus
In 378 Socrates ﬁrst speaks of “a very small audience” entitled to hear 
the censored tales of the poets.  So far I have suggested that Glaucon and 
Adimantus do not—or better, since they have actually already heard the 
tales, should not—belong to that audience. This interpretation coheres 
with the idea that Glaucon and Adimantus possess different motivations 
for, and different levels of appreciation of the agreements they make with 
Socrates. But this interpretation faces some obvious objections.  First, 
Plato’s Republic and Censorship in Philosophy and Poetry
L&A 2009.1.indd   127 9/9/09   8:49:36 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 128 
Glaucon and Adimantus are not censored from the tales of the poets in 
the Republic.  In fact, they are the ones who introduce them, and Socrates 
shows no indication in the discussion that they should not be hearing 
these tales.  Secondly, as we have noted, Socrates compares himself and 
his two interlocutors to “founders of a state”.  I have suggested that this 
appellation is misleading in regard to Glaucon and Adimantus, but more 
explanation is now needed. I propose that we are meant to see Glaucon 
and Adimantus neither as belonging to the select few, nor indeed the 
motley horde.  Rather, they are being tested in order to see what class they 
belong to, and how far they can be led.  Let us examine this proposition 
and its implications more carefully.
In testing the mettle of future leaders, Socrates stresses the need to 
“observe them at every period of life”, to ensure that they never be brought, 
either by sorcery or by force, to “expel from their souls unawares [the] 
conviction that they must do what is best for the state” (412e).   From this 
and the exchange that follows, we can see that Glaucon and Adimantus 
are being tested and observed in a like manner.
Glaucon asks what is meant by “expelling”, and Socrates replies that 
it seems to him that “the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary 
or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who 
learns better, involuntary that of every true belief” (412e–413a). Glaucon 
asks for clariﬁcation of the term “involuntary”, and Socrates rejoins: “don’t 
you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good 
things but willingly of evil?” (413a). 
Glaucon seems to understand, and he agrees that men are unwillingly 
deprived of true opinions. When, however, Socrates goes on to speak of 
how this happens by theft, by sorcery, or by force, Glaucon is once again 
dumbfounded. Socrates responds by saying that it must be because he is 
“talking in high tragic style,” and so he once again spells out his meaning 
in plainer fashion: 
By those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are 
overpersuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, and in the 
other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs … by those who are 
constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels to 
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change their minds … and the victims of sorcery I am sure you too would 
say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or are 
terriﬁed by some fear (413b–c). 
Again Glaucon is brought to apprehension. Socrates then reiterates 
his point about needing to test the “indwelling conviction” of future 
guardians to do what is best for the state. Those whose belief is “sure 
and who cannot be beguiled”, will be accepted, and all the rest will be 
“cross[ed] off” (413c).
There seems to be irony in Plato’s portrayal of Glaucon’s inability to 
follow Socrates’ “high tragic style.” Glaucon’s understanding of the notion 
of involuntary expulsion escapes him unawares, as if his true beliefs had 
been stolen from him, or taken by force or trickery, by Socrates’ poetic 
charm. As a kind of counter-spell, Socrates is made to spell out these true 
beliefs more plainly. In this way, we can see how Glaucon’s true beliefs 
are stolen through forgetfulness and over-persuasion. Does a similar 
thing occur with Adimantus? Is he tricked, perhaps, through fear, into 
relinquishing true beliefs about warring gods and heroes?
[Editor’s note: There is another gap here.  The evidence for Adimantus being 
similarly tricked is not presented.]
The forms of involuntary expulsion describe well the ﬂoundering 
of Socrates’ two interlocutors. But is it fair to say that the beliefs lost by 
each pertain to the conviction to do what is best for the state? Are not 
Glaucon and Adimantus true founders of a state? Socrates speaks of the 
need to test potential statesmen, by “bring[ing] them into fears and again 
pass[ing] them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than 
men do gold in the ﬁre” (413d-e), to see if they remain “immune” to such 
sorcery and conserve their composure as guardians both of themselves 
and of the culture they have received. Those selected and appointed to 
ofﬁce must maintain “the true rhythm and harmony of  [their] being in all 
those conditions, and the character that would make [them] most useful 
to [themselves] and to the state” (413e). Would Glaucon and Adimantus 
pass this stringent test? Given the above account of their performances, 
it seems doubtful. Those designated as guardians of soul and state are 
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said to be “watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that 
the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm” 
(414b). If Glaucon and Adimantus are robbed of the truth in the ways 
outlined above, they would surely have to be scratched from the list of 
contenders. 
VII. The Phoenician Tale and its Relevance to the Interlocutors
Socrates indicates the need at this point to contrive an “opportune 
falsehood” (414b-c). He will recount a “sort of Phoenician tale”—a tale of 
something that has happened in different parts of the world, but which 
is unlikely to have happened in their own day, and which “demands no 
little persuasion to make it believable”: “I hardly know”, he begins, 
how to ﬁnd the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade 
ﬁrst the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city 
that in good sooth all our training and educating of them were things that 
they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream, but that 
in reality at that time they were down within the earth being moulded and 
fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment 
were being fashioned. And when they were quite ﬁnished the earth as being 
their mother delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother 
and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against 
any attack and regard other citizens as their brothers and children of the 
selfsame earth. (414d-e)
Glaucon acknowledges the inevitable difﬁculty in convincing the 
citizenry of this tale, but Socrates pushes on with it, turning next to the 
metaphor of gold, silver and bronze divisions within the state (415). 
What is to be made of this whole “opportune falsehood”? Is it that, 
as with children’s tales, there is valuable truth to be extracted from the 
lie? And if so, what might be the appropriate method of extraction? One 
approach worth testing is that employed by Socrates in the very lead-up 
to this tale. In discussing the departure of true beliefs from the mind, 
Socrates’ “high tragic style” led him to speak of convictions, expulsions, 
theft, force, and sorcery. This high-handed manner of speaking, with its 
appeal to criminological terms, goes over Glaucon’s head, and robs him 
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of apprehension. Yet, when this meaning is extracted from the conceit, 
by being laid out in plain language, Glaucon is able to recognise its truth 
(as one whose prior convictions are reinstated). In this way, Socrates 
demonstrates how truth can be extracted from falsehood through isolating 
the content of speech from the manner of its presentation. A similar process 
of extraction seems to be called for with Socrates’ “Phoenician tale.”
In employing this method to extract truth from this tale, we should 
focus on the idea that all the training and educating of the rulers and 
soldiers “were really things imagined and that happened to them as it were 
in a dream, but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth 
being moulded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest 
of their equipment were being fashioned.”  One interpretation would be 
to see this “training and educating” as the guidance and instruction set 
out in the dialogue. On this view, the following gloss can be given of the 
passage: Socrates here presents a striking revelation, if only Glaucon and 
Adimantus can see it, concerning the true nature of the inquiry being held 
between him and his several companions. By analogy with the Phoenician 
tale told to the rulers and soldiers, he reveals to Glaucon and Adimantus 
that the laws or canons set down by them for establishing the best state 
are also, in fact, mere imaginings. Being constructed using the tools of 
the mimetic poet, these laws or canons are ﬁrmly cemented within the 
realm of imagination and ideas. They pertain to an imaginary state, and 
are contained within an imaginary constitution. 
In founding this state, the weapons and equipment of its guardians 
are fashioned to nurture the development of beautiful ideas and to abort 
the growth of sinister phantoms. But these arms must be placed within 
the right hands in order to be effective. To ensure this, potential guardians 
are placed on trial and tested on their knowledge and understanding 
of this equipment. This trial is imposed on Glaucon and Adimantus, 
as co-founders of a state, and involves testing their familiarity with the 
proper use of various tools of argument and artiﬁce. They are tested on 
their awareness of the proper limits of such devices, and on their ability 
to respect these limits in practice. When a certain device is abused—for 
example, an analogy extended beyond just limits—it comes to be fashioned 
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as a tool of injustice. Both the weapon and the arguments it assails come 
to be moulded after the patterns of injustice found within the soul of the 
false guardian. And, by fostering this element in their soul, the nobler 
part is weakened and destroyed. Through the whole process of training 
and education, these guardians are thus moulded, and in the end are 
delivered up from the earth their mother—the spiritual plain of the soul. 
The true guardians are also tested and moulded through training, but, 
in their case, it is the patterns of justice that are followed and fostered. In 
testing their mettle, the able warriors keep steadfast and true, possessing 
solid gold within their constitution. Knowing the true nature of mimetic 
armaments, he employs them in watching over friends and foes. And in 
this role, he guards over the three divisions of the ideal state—admitting 
what is akin to wisdom and learning, and banishing what is not.25  It is in 
this way that the soil of blessed lands reaps a heavenly crop. 
This interpretation of the Phoenician tale at 414d ff. counts on Socrates’ 
analogy between the constitutions of the soul and the state. The true 
guardians may be construed as personiﬁcations of the ruling element, 
with this element being what enables just men to gain mastery over 
themselves. 
How reasonable and plausible is it to take Socrates’ analogy this far? 
Aside from the point in Book II where he ﬁrst raises the comparison, there 
is explicit mention of it in a couple of signiﬁcant passages in Book X. First, 
Socrates appeals to it at 605, when the ﬁnal and most stringent censorship 
upon poetry is passed.26 There he states:
We may at last say that we are justiﬁed in not admitting the mimetic poet 
into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in 
the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as 
when in a state one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them 
and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that 
the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by 
fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favor with 
the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but 
calls the same thing now one, now the other. (605b-c, italics mine) 
A precise analogy is here drawn between the constitutions of the soul 
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and state, and Socrates’ listener is invited to view the censorship of poetry 
as pertaining to both. At this point Socrates goes on to speak of poetry’s 
power to corrupt “with rare exceptions, even the better sort” (605c). By 
keeping sight of the analogy, this accusation can be understood to relate 
to both sorts of constitution. Only the well-tuned soul or state is exempt 
from risk—one harmonised under the rule of the rational. In these cases, 
the poetic Muse would be unable to consort freely with the “inferior” 
elements in the state (whether it be of the soul or city), while bypassing 
the rational sector. By remaining cognisant of the true nature of poetry, 
this sector would safeguard itself, and the state within its control, from 
conspiracy and tyranny. 
VIII. The Falseness of Poetry: Fact or Fiction?
The overt ground for the censorship of poetry is that it is false. Socrates 
suggested censoring the poets from telling false tales about gods and men. 
However, the conﬂation between banning the poets because of their false 
tales and banning them because of their harmful tales (whether true or 
false), has already been highlighted. We saw that due to the potential harm 
caused by certain tales, it was agreed that they ought to be construed as 
false. A tale was then deemed false (irrespective of its actual truth or falsity) 
if it contained sayings about gods or men harmful to the ears of thoughtless 
young persons. Thus, Socrates advocated censorship, not so much on the 
grounds of falseness, but in order to protect the masses.  This reason for 
censorship was made more plain by the fact that Socrates was willing to 
invoke noble or serviceable lies, using the very same devices found in 
poetry, in order to convince the masses, and even the rulers and soldiers, 
of socially beneﬁcial beliefs. 
In the case of the Phoenician tale, which has demonstrable parallels 
with the relation between Socrates and his interlocutors, the very fact 
that Socrates shows himself to be invoking a noble lie is worth reﬂecting 
on. Socrates does not say that, at the broader level of the dialogue, he is 
lying to Glaucon and Adimantus, but clearly he does at times withhold 
information (as in the conversation with Glaucon about well-bred hounds 
and men), and in the Phoenician tale he lays out the parallels for anyone to 
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see.  If Socrates’ greatest concern with poetry relates to its harmful effects 
on the masses, it is tempting to infer that he might resort to falsehood in 
protecting any that might be among them from its inﬂuence. If, moreover, 
Socrates is testing the mettle of his interlocutors throughout the whole 
inquiry (to establish whether they are thoughtless young persons or 
potential guardians of a state), it is reasonable to infer that he would speak 
in hushed tones about the truth behind the falsehood.
If my guess is correct, the so-called quarrel between philosophy and 
poetry, depicted in dramatic form in the ﬁctional dialogue Republic, is one 
of the serviceable lies, told to protect the masses who do not understand 
the real nature and necessity of poetry. A justiﬁcation for this view emerges 
from the need, outside of the ﬁction of the Republic, for a just depiction of 
the dispute and a just defence of poetry. The Republic, after all, is written 
in a “high tragic style”, and by analogy with 413, we need to interpret it 
in order to extract the truth.  
It is interesting that Socrates himself calls for a just defence of poetry 
after banishing the poets in Book X. Having ﬁnally concluded the case 
against them, with the aid of his two key witnesses, Socrates reafﬁrms 
the importance of following the path of truth (607c). He then goes on to 
prescribe a remedy for countering the charm of poetry: one must chant 
over to oneself the reasons given as a “counter-charm to her spell” (608a). 
Following the truth bespoken in argument, he then reconﬁrms the need 
for him and his interlocutors to avoid the “childish loves of the multitude” 
(608a). This measure must, he maintains, be enforced, until the “mimetic 
and dulcet poetry”, or one of her prose-writing advocates, provides 
“reason” to contradict it. Until, that is, a reason is provided for her role in 
a “well ordered state” (607d). It is precisely the need to ﬁnd such a reason 
that I have tried to point to in this paper. 
In further investigating this reason, I am convinced it will be seen that 
philosophy and poetry stand, or fall, together. Sharing the same tools and 
the same state-ofﬁce (that of secret legislators), the poets and philosophers 
have a lot in common. The plots or divisions they control fall under the 
same state borders. Ought not the two unite, then, on account of shared 
purposes and pursuits?  In my view, poetry and philosophy are admitted 
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to, or censored from the ideal state together. Support for this reading can 
be found by considering the descriptions of their individual exiles in the 
Republic. Both the poets and the philosophers are described as being shut 
off from the masses. The poets are portrayed as shut off from the insatiable 
horde in the theatre, and, in Book 6, the philosophers are portrayed as shut 
off from the infectious haughtiness of the multitude. This sort of exile is 
ambiguous. Exactly who or what is censoring, and being censored, is a 
slippery issue. But the same sort of thing seems to be going on whether 
it is the poets or the philosophers being considered. “[T]he present low 
estate” of philosophy (495d), as Socrates puts it, is on a par with that of 
poetry—both being in need of a nurturing parent. And the description 
of those out to deﬁle the philosophical nature—those said to be “stuffed 
with empty pride and void of sense”—matches that of the motley horde 
insensible to poetic truth. 
Starting from this hypothesis about the censorship of poetry and 
philosophy, the task of attacking or defending my interpretation can now 
begin. My interpretation is, I submit, intimated in the Republic, despite 
appearances to the contrary. It points to a way of resolving the quarrel 
between philosophy and poetry through active combat, and it points to 
a renewed call to arms in defending and attacking from all sides. As a 
defence of and attack on both poetry and philosophy, my interpretation 
might seem highly objectionable. But a ruthlessly critical onslaught is 
precisely what is called for. Given this requirement, the only remaining 
demand is, as Socrates says when inviting a defence of poetry, that one 
must “listen benevolently” (607d) to all that is said.  
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